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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyse leadership in Polish political parties in comparative perspective. 
In the further parts of this paper, the methods of leader selections, their competitiveness, as well as reasons 
for their stepping down are discussed. Similarly to the western political parties, the Polish ones have been 
changing their methods of leadership selection. So far each time it has consisted in a formal increase in the 
inclusiveness of the selection. The reasons for transferring the rights relating to the leadership selection to 
party members were brought closer to the premises typical for Westminster democracies rather than the 
consensual ones. The analysis of the Polish case shows that the internal elections have been characterized 
by different levels of competitiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
A rise in the significance of political party leaders has become a clear and ba-
sically uncontested trend in contemporary democracies. Their status as heads of 
governments is growing, they are expanding their autonomy within their own parties, 
and also – although to a lesser extent – it is on them that election campaigns tend to 
concentrate [Poguntke, Webb 2005: 337 ff.]. Although the name of the phenomenon 
introduced in the literature (i.e. ‘presidentialisation’) met with criticism, the very fact 
itself of power concentration in the hands of political leaders appears not to raise 
any stronger controversy [Dowding 2013].
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Despite the role which party leaders play, this issue has not been investigated 
thoroughly so far, especially when it comes to comparative studies [Pilet, Cross 2014c: 
222]. The publications relating to leadership in political parties are dispersed, dominated 
by case studies which undertake to discuss questions of, inter alia, concrete cases of 
party leadership, changes of leader selection procedures, party leader election compet-
itiveness, or social-demographic profiles of leaders. Comparative studies are becoming 
a more and more frequent field of research, though their number is still limited and 
the studies tend to focus only on some of the countries. The aim of this paper is to 
analyse leadership in Polish political parties in comparative perspective. In the further 
parts of this paper, the methods of leader selections, their competitiveness, as well as 
reasons for their stepping down are discussed. The size of individual sections of this 
article corresponds to the position of individual problems found in the publications.
DEGREE OF INCLUSIVENESS OF THE SELECTORATE
Contemporary political parties differ in the manner of party leader selection. Po-
tential candidates may be required to meet various requirements. The entities varying 
in number of voters may elect candidates. The election procedures may also vary 
considerably. The scope of differences may be illustrated with the examples of the 
situations in Israel and Italy. In the ultra-orthodox Israeli party Shas, its spiritual leader 
appointed its political leaders in an arbitrary manner [Kenig 2009c: 65–66]. On the other 
hand, all the citizens, including legal immigrants and the persons over 16, were able 
to take part in the Secretary General elections of the Italian Democratic Party in 2007 
and 2009, though the Italian law denies the voting right to those two groups in general 
elections [Corbetta, Vignati 2013: 83; Seddone, Venturino 2013: 304]. In practice, there 
are six methods of party leader selection. They can be chosen (1) by a single person, 
(2) by a party elite, (3) by parliamentary party group, (4) by a party representative 
body, (5) by party members, (6) by electorate [Kenig 2009a: 435]. These methods can 
be placed on an axis spanning from the most exclusive to the most inclusive (Fig. 1). 
Each of the methods provides a different level of legitimization, and – as some of the 
authors suggest – influences the choice of different leaders [LeDuc 2001: 325–326; 
McSweeney 1999].
Figure 1. Methods of choosing political party leaders
Source: [Kenig 2009a: 435].
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The issue of inclusiveness should be differentiated from that of election decen-
tralization. Those two elements are not identical [Hazan, Rahat 2006: 112]. Decen-
tralization refers to the participation of local and regional bodies in decision making. 
The decentralization itself may mean that the powers have been shifted from the 
central elite level down to the local (regional) one. In this way, the selection may be 
decentralized, but due to a possible change in the number of the persons taking the 
decision, the inclusiveness of election may be diminished [Hazan, Rahat 2006: 112].
As regards Polish political parties, there have been so far three methods of party 
leader selection i.e. (1) by a parliamentary party group; (2) by a party representative 
body; (3) by party members.1 A party leader has been selected twice by the parlia-
mentary group. The only party which decided on this move was the Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska, PO). In October 2001, Maciej Płażyński was elected the 
leader of the PO [MS 2003], and following his resignation in April 2003, the party 
1 The following documents have been used as the sources of information: Socjaldemokracja Rzec-
zypospolitej Polskiej [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] – The Statute passed by the Founding 
Congress on 28 January 1990, with amendments adopted by the National Convention of the SdRP on 18 May 
1991, the Second Congress of the SdRP on 20–21 March 1993, and the National Convention of the SdRP on 
23 April 1994, and the Third Congres of the SdRP on 6–7 December 1997; Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 
[Democratic Left Alliance] – The Statute of the SLD. The consolidated text adopted by the Fifth Congress of 
the SLD on 28 April 2012; Unia Pracy [Labour Union] – Program Resolution and the statute adopted by the 
First Congress of the UP on 23–24 January 1993, Warsaw; Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Platform] – The 
Statute of the Civic Platform adopted on 29 June 2013; Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe [Polish Peasant Party] 
– The Statute of the PSL. The consolidated text covering changes passed by the Tenth Congress of the PSL 
on 8 November 2008, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – Porozumienie Ludowe [Polish Peasant Party – Peas-
ants’ Agreement] – The Statute of Polish Peasant Party – Peasants’ Agreement, 1991; Unia Demokratyczna 
[Democratic Union] – The Statute of the Democratic Union, Warsaw 1991; KLD [Liberal Democratic Con-
gress] – The Statute of the Liberal Democratic Congress, Warsaw 1991; Unia Wolności [Freedom Union] 
– The Statute of the Freedom Union passed by the Third National Congress of the Freedom Union on 26 
January 1997, with amendments adopted by the Fourth National Congress of the Freedom Union; Akcja 
Wyborcza Solidarność [Solidarity Electoral Action] – The Statute of the Solidarity Electoral Action Social 
Movement; Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform [Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms] – The Statute 
of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms, 1993; Porozumienie Centrum [Centre Agreement] – The 
Statute of the Centre Agreement, Warsaw 1990; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice] – The Statute 
of the Law and Justice adopted during the Fourth Congress of the PiS in Warsaw on 29 June 2013; Ruch 
Odbudowy Polski [Movement for Reconstruction of Poland] – The Statute of the Movement for Reconstruc-
tion of Poland passed by the First Congress of the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland in Warsaw on 
14 December 1997; Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe [Christian National Union] – The consolidated 
text of the statute of the ZChN with amendments introduced during the Seventh Convention of the ZChN 
in Częstochowa (28 February–1 March 1998); Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej [Confederation for Inde-
pendent Poland] – The Statute of the Confederation for Independent Poland passed by the Sixth Congress 
on 9 November 1996; Liga Polskich Rodzin [League of Polish Families] – The Statute of League of Polish 
Families; Ruch Palikota [the Palikot’s Movement] – The Statute of the Palikot’s Movement; Samoobrona 
[Self-Defense] – The Statute of the Self-Defense. In the case of doubts relating to the dates of issuance of 
the statutes or the lack of such, the dating of party documents made by the Archives of Political Parties of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences has been used. The word of comment concerns the inclusion of the BBWR 
in the analyses. That formation was established as an association, not as a political party, yet despite that, its 
statute records (§7 art. 5) clearly indicate that one of the goals it set for itself was participation in elections. 
Cf. [Gładkiewicz 2004: 14 ff.].
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MPs elected Donald Tusk for the post [F.G. 2003]. Twice has the leader been directly 
elected by party members. In 2012, that took place in the Democratic Left Alliance 
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and in 2013 – in the PO. Generally, the ma-
jority of the Polish political parties, irrespective of their ideological profile, entrust 
their representative bodies with the task of leader selection.
An analysis of the Polish case in comparative European perspective shows that 
political parties in Poland tend to reach for the same method of party leader selection, 
namely, by electing the leaders by a party representative body (usually called a con-
gress, a convention, a conference or an assembly), attended by delegates chosen at local 
and regional levels and often by party Members of Parliament. It needs to be clearly 
underlined that party bodies may often merely legitimize the decision taken earlier by 
party elites who have proposed one candidate of considerable popularity, who is later 
formally accepted by the congress. It appears that, as regards the Polish political parties, 
the fact whether the decision as to a leader selection is taken by a party congress or, 
for instance, by a party council, or directly by party members, is indeed of secondary 
importance, because formally democratic and inclusive procedures legitimize the prior 
arrangements concerning candidates who are to take over party leadership.
DIRECT ELECTIONS OF PARTy LEADERS
Democratization is often linked to expansion of the leadership selectorate. It 
must be stressed, however, that vital factors that need to be analysed are, inter alia, 
requirements concerning running in internal elections (such as contest fee or signature 
requirements) which can make it impossible or hamper entering the competition, 
and also informal norms relating to the candidate. The following analysis will focus 
solely on the selectorate.
During the last two decades, political parties in Europe began to democratise their 
leadership selection in the sense described above, that is, broadening the selectorate 
[Kenig 2009a; LeDuc 2001; Lisi 2010: 128]. The empirical studies suggest that such 
a move usually takes place (1) in the case of newly established parties, (2) after lost 
elections, (3) when a party is in opposition [Cross, Blais 2012: 134]. These stimuli 
were concluded on the basis of an analysis of the states representing majoritarian 
model of democracy. As other studies have shown, the influence of these factors has 
not been retained in Belgium, which is a consensual democracy [Wauters 2014].
As regards the sphere of institutional solutions, Poland presents a case of a state 
with the consensual democracy. Out of ten features characterizing this model, eight 
can be found in Poland. The analysis of the Polish political practice indicates, how-
ever, the existing similarities to the majoritarian model based on getting the majority 
over political opponents [Antoszewski 2012: 57–58].
Among the analysed political parties in Poland, two have changed their meth-
ods of leader selection. In both cases their leadership selectorate was expanded. In 
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2012, the SLD – as the first parliamentary political party – ran a direct election of 
its leader by party members. 21 961 party members cast valid votes.2 Earlier it was 
the Congress of the party that had had the right to select the party member for this 
post. The SLD introduced changes into the method of selecting their leader, follow-
ing the election defeat in 2011, when the party got the worst result ever. In the case 
of the PO, up to 2003 it was its parliamentary party group who used to select the 
party leader. After passing the new party statute in June 20033 the filling of the post 
became the responsibility of the National Convention – a party representative body. 
That change entailed democratization of election of the party leader. In 2003, the 
parliamentary party group of the PO consisted of 56 people while choosing the party 
leader.4 On the other hand, in the election held during the First National Convention 
of the party in June 2003 there were 1,653 votes cast [Gawryś 2003]. The PO, at the 
convention of 2003, adopted a new statute which transferred this prerogative from 
the parliamentary party group onto the congress. That was a part of more substantial 
changes towards the broadening of internal democracy within the party. The former 
centralistic solutions had proved not functional both to leaders and members of the 
party [Sobolewska-Myślik, Kosowska-Gąstoł, Borowiec 2009: 43]. In 2006, the 
National Convention of the PO (i.e. the party congress) obligated the National Board 
to run a direct election of the party leader in the next term of office.5 In 2013, the PO 
changed the party leader selection procedure again. The modified statute allowed all 
party members to take part in voting.
The direct elections of party leaders did not lead to achieving similar results in 
the political parties which decided for that move. As regards the SLD, in the elec-
tion of 2012, in which all the party members were able to participate, Leszek Miller 
did not have any counter-candidate and the election itself seemed not to attract any 
major interest on the part of the mass media. The case of the PO was quite different, 
though. The leadership battle between Donald Tusk and Jarosław Gowin was covered 
extensively by the mass media, the more so as the dispute between the two politi-
cians was aggravating. The competitiveness of intra-party election also increased 
considerably. Its more detailed presentation may be found in the next section of 
this article. The situational contexts connected with the introduction of leadership 
selection by party members were similar in the case of both parties – the SLD and 
the PO decided for that move while being at a crisis point. In the case of the former, 
it had resulted directly from the defeat suffered in the 2011 General Elections, when 
2 The results of the SLD chairman election – a multimedia presentation, http://www.sld.org.pl/
aktualnosci/82-wyniki_wyborow_na_przewodniczacego_sld__prezentacja_multimedialna.html (access 
29.06.2015).
3 The Statute of the Civic Platform adopted by the First National Convention of the PO on 1 June 
2003.
4 The state as for the end of the 4th term of office of the Sejm: www.sejm.gov.pl.
5 The resolution of the Third National Convention of the Civic Platform of 21 May 2006 concerning 
preparation of the new method of running elections within the structures of the PO.
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the party suffered the worst defeat in its history. Prior to that, the right to select the 
leader belonged only to its Congress. In the case of the PO, the issues of the low public 
support for the party and the fact that it had formed the government in coalition with 
the PSL seemed to be important for the change. The PiS began to gain popularity 
and in part of the opinion polls it began to come closer to the PO, which had had 
no serious rivals to reckon with before. In this way, the reasons for transferring the 
rights relating to the leadership selection to party members were brought closer to 
the premises typical for Westminster democracies rather than the consensual ones.
Concluding the first part of the considerations, it is worth underlining the fact that 
similarly to the western political parties, the Polish ones have been changing their 
methods of leadership selection. So far, each time it has consisted in a formal increase 
in the inclusiveness of the selection. Like in the case of the parties functioning in 
the Westminster states, the democratization has been a result of the crisis which the 
parties in question had to overcome and an attempt at regaining legitimization, as 
well as the former position on the political stage. Regarding the SLD and the PO, 
the direct election of the leaders was imposed by the party authorities, without any 
considerable pressure from party activists or members to gain larger inclusiveness. 
Thus, it was rather a different situation from the one that occurred in the case of the 
British Conservative Party, in which the pressure of the activists advocating greater 
democratization of the party in this sphere led to the changes. The election held by 
the PO, and to a lesser extent the one held by the SLD, were organized on the con-
ditions in which the current leader could not be guaranteed a victory, but he could 
still be very likely to win them.
COMPETITIVENESS IN PARTy LEADERSHIP SELECTIONS 
Competitiveness can be brought down to the alternativeness of choice, and 
therefore the possibility of, at least, potential replacement of those who are in power 
[Antoszewski 2004: 13]. Kenig put forward several proposals of competitiveness 
measurement methods for party leader selections. The first of them relates to a success 
or a defeat of the current leader while running for re-election. The second method 
refers to the probability of entering a rivalry for the leader’s position. When there 
is only one candidate, we come to deal with “coronation”, whereas when there are 
at least two such candidates – with rivalry. Another method is based on indicating 
the number of candidates to fight for leadership in the party. In order to measure 
competitiveness Kenig developed a distribution of votes index (ENC/N) applicable 
to competing candidates [Kenig 2009b: 244–245].
In the study, the selection competitiveness measurement has been made mainly 
by means of the index of effective number of parties, which had been worked out by 
Golosov [Golosov 2010]. Its adaptation to carrying out analyses of party leadership 
has been dictated by a few reasons, and – in particular – by the possibility of synthetic 
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presentation of the rivalry result and the prospect of making comparisons. Neither 
the Laakso-Taagepera index of effective number of parties, which is classical on 
the ground of analysis of party systems [Laakso, Taagepera 1979], nor the ENC/C 
index, which is founded on the former, [Kenig 2009b: 245] has been applied. The 
Laakso-Taagepera index has met with extensive criticism [Dunleavy, Boucek 2003; 
Golosov 2010]. Its drawbacks can come to light, among others, in producing mislead-
ing scores for party constellations, in which the largest parties obtain over 50% of 
election support [Golosov 2010]. Support of this and a greater scale in an intra-party 
election – as presented below – is not a rare occurrence. Therefore, applying this 
index or indexes that are based on it could lead to erroneous conclusions. The index 
elaborated by Golosov has been successfully applied in analyses of competitiveness 
of elections within parties [Quinn 2012: 168 ff.]. Its calculation leads to indicating 
the effective (“factual” or “actual”) number of candidates running for leadership. 
Intuitiveness of interpretation is its advantage. For instance, the value of 3.1 means 
that there were about three real contenders who took part in the race for the leader’s 
position. Its minimum value equals 1 and occurs in practice when there was only 
one person running for the post.
Table 1. Competitiveness in Polish political party leader elections
Election Winner Number of candidates ENC
Percentage point advantage 
over the runner-up 
PiS
29.05.2001 Lech Kaczyński 1 1 –
01.12.2001 Lech Kaczyński 1 1 –
18.06.2003 Jarosław Kaczyński 1 1 –
03.06.2006 Jarosław Kaczyński 1 1 –
06.03.2010 Jarosław Kaczyński 1 1 –
29.06.2013 Jarosław Kaczyński 1 1 –
PO
19.10.2003 Maciej Płażyński 1 1 –
09.04.2003 Donald Tusk 1 1 –
01.06.2003 Donald Tusk 1 1 –
21.05.2006 Donald Tusk 2 1.19 69.21
26.06.2010 Donald Tusk 1 1 –
23.08.2013* Donald Tusk 2 1.26 59.15
PSL
05.05.1990 Roman Bartoszcze 3 1.99 15.16
29.06.1991 Waldemar Pawlak 3 2.11 23.22
21.11.1992 Waldemar Pawlak 1 1 –
23.11.1996 Waldemar Pawlak 3 1.84 24.08
23.10.1997 Jarosław Kalinowski 2 1.59 25.71
24.03.2000 Jarosław Kalinowski 2 1.13 77.19
16.03.2004 Janusz Wojciechowski 2 2.25 11.20
29.01.2005 1st ballot – 2 1.41 41.67
29.01.2005 2nd ballot Waldemar Pawlak 1 1 –
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08.11.2008 Waldemar Pawlak 2 1.20 66.75
SdRP
29.01.1990 Aleksander Kwaśniew-ski 3 1.12 84.56
20–21.03.1993 Aleksander Kwaśniew-ski 1 1 –
27.01.1996 Józef Oleksy 1 1 –
06.12.1997 Leszek Miller 2 1.28 56.68
SLD
01.07.1999 Leszek Miller 1 1 –
18.12.1999 Leszek Miller 1 1 –
29.06.2003 Leszek Miller 1 1 –
06.03.2004 1st ballot – 5 2.99 12.89
06.03.2004 2nd ballot Krzysztof Janik 2 1.59 25.64
18.12.2004 1st ballot – 3 2.30 1.44
18.12.2004 2nd ballot Józef Oleksy 2 1.81 10.48
29.05.2005 Wojciech Olejniczak 2 1.55 28.99
31.05.2008 Grzegorz Napieralski 2 1.91 4.76
10.12.2011 Leszek Miller 4 1.34 65.06
28.04.2012* Leszek Miller 1 1 –
* – election results date
Source: Prepared on the basis of press releases. The first SdRP election results [cf. Tomczak 2003: 19]; the first and the 
second PSL elections [cf. Hartliński 2011: 262].
Comparing the number of candidates running for the post, the PiS leader elec-
tions are the least competitive of all the political parties under analysis. PiS leader 
Jarosław Kaczyński has had no counter-candidate at the party congresses so far 
and each time he has been able to renew his mandate. The internal elections with-
in the PO have been characterized by a low, yet higher that in the case of the PiS 
level of competitiveness. Within the PO, the rivalry in the race for the post of the 
party leader, symbolic though it was, appeared for the first time during the election 
of 2006, when Andrzej Machowski, a party member and the Mayor of a Warsaw 
district-town of Ursynów, was the opponent of Donald Tusk, who was running for 
his re-election. Machowski’s result then was 97 votes, while Tusk’s one equalled 
to 533 [Majewski, Reszka 2011: 65]. A far more competitive election followed in 
2013, when Gowin was Tusk’s opponent. On the other hand, the average value of 
the ENC index for the PSL amounts to 1.59. The statute of this formation requires 
at least two candidates to run for the post, which raises the level of competitiveness 
in an artificial way, while the opposing candidates do not offer real competition to 
each other. Such a scenario took place in the election carried out during the Seventh 
Congress of the PSL in 2000, with Jarosław Kalinowski winning 576 votes, while 
his rival – Stanisław Żelichowski, who had decided to run for the post after being 
persuaded to do so – managed to get only 73 votes. If one were to accept that in the 
both cases there was only one person who was running for the post of the leader, 
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then the ENC index would amount to 1.56. Taking into consideration the reservation 
relating to the actual competitiveness of the elections in the PSL, the SLD ought to 
be acknowledged to be a party with generally the highest competitiveness level as 
regards the election of the party leader. In the case of the SdRP/SLD, the average 
value of the ENC index amounts to 1.49, taking into account merely the elections of 
the July and the December of 1999. Such a move seems justified if one takes account 
of the considerable nearness of the two events in time, which was connected with 
the process of party registration. Until 1999, that is until the moment of the SdRP 
transforming, together with the other units forming the SLD coalition, into one party, 
the competitiveness had remained at a relatively low level. Leszek Miller’s leaving 
the post of the SLD leader was connected with a substantial rise in the competitive-
ness of the new party leader elections. The position of the very SLD itself on the 
political stage had been considerably weakened prior to that, in consequence of being 
in government. In the case of the SdRP, basically throughout the whole time of its 
functioning, there was a consensus relating to the candidate for the leader. That had 
been expressed in a considerable advantage over the other candidate/s (the winner 
enjoyed the support from over 70% of the delegates) if there were more leadership 
contenders. The situation changed along with the establishment of the SLD as one 
consolidated formation and the resignation of Miller – its first leader and Prime Min-
ister in the years 2001–2004. Thus, the thesis which advances the idea of replacing 
the consensual strategy of selecting the party leader with competing for leadership 
seems justified. Nevertheless, this conclusion is weakened by the fact that the 2012 
party leadership election was run with only one candidate.
Referring the Polish case to comparative studies, it needs underlining that elec-
tion turnout on the nationwide level [Fauvelle-Aymar, François 2006] and on the 
internal one within the party [Lisi 2010; Wauters 2015] is linked to competition. 
However, the analysis of Polish cases has not confirmed this regularity. Juxtaposing 
the turnouts while choosing the leader of the SLD in 2012 (60.5%) and the leader 
of the PO in 2013 (51.12%) does not entitle one to conclude that the low turnout 
originates from a lack of intra-party rivalry for power. Including members in the 
intra-party decision-making process, analysed in this study through the prism of 
introduction of direct democracy in party leader selection, did not lead to a rise in 
the number of party members. Obviously, there was no such intention on the part of 
both parties, either. This situation is different from that observed in Canadian parties 
[Carty, Blake 1999].
CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN POLITICAL PARTIES
In a similar way as Robert Michels did it while formulating the “iron law of 
oligarchy”, contemporary researchers of political parties generally accept that elites 
establish control over the party at the expense of activists and ordinary members 
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[Loxbo 2013: 538]. Researchers who proposed the cartel party thesis, claim that 
through formal strengthening of the rights of rank-and-file party members the decision 
making role played by middle level activists is limited. These decisions include, for 
example, acceptance of the election program, recruitment of elites (especially those 
representing parties in parliament), or election of the party leader [Katz 2001: 290; 
Katz, Mair 2009: 759; Mair 1997: 11]. Still, there are proposed opposing interpre-
tations, too, according to which party leaders become more open to preferences of 
party members and the electorate [Kitschelt 2000].
It is worth noting in this place a case study analysing the intra-party democracy 
in the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Sweden (SAP). In the light of conducted 
studies, the leaders of the party had less power at their disposal, whereas activists 
enjoyed more influence in the 1990s than in the period of flourishing of mass parties 
in the 1950s [Loxbo 2013: 549]. Independently of the role which is attributed to re-
search of the case-study type in falsifying theories [Flyvbjerg 2006; Lijphart 1971: 
692], an analysis of the democracy within the SAP proves that autonomy of leaders 
in contemporary parties should not be overestimated.
With reference to Great Britain, McAnulla pointed to four trends which con-
tribute to forced exits of party leaders. They refer to the following: (1) the increased 
importance of perception of leadership; (2) progressing “celebrity” politics; (3) the 
erosion of the boundaries between public and private life; (4) the increased profes-
sionalization of politics [McAnulla 2010: 593].
In the light of systematic studies on the impact of election results on the ability 
of party leaders to keep their posts, there emerges a distinctive pattern of remov-
ing ineffective leaders [Andrews, Jackman 2008: 674]. For large parties, a loss of 
seats in Parliament entails depriving the leader of the post, the probability of his/
her resignation growing higher when the given party does not manage to enter the 
government. In other words, careers of leaders are not endangered as long as their 
parties are increasing the number of seats in Parliament and they become heads of 
governments. The careers of small party leaders are closely connected with election 
results, which – in turn – translate into the number of seats won. Leaders of small 
parties can have a considerable influence on this, in contrast to the issue of entering 
a government as a junior partner. A poor election result and in the consequence of 
it – a weak position in parliament can put an end to the career of leaders of small 
political parties [Andrews, Jackman 2008: 674–675].
An analysis of the causes behind the dismissal of leaders of the Social Democratic 
Party of Denmark has revealed, in turn, that the election result played only a partial 
role in removal of one in three leaders of that party. Four election defeats did not 
entail changing the leader. The dominating reason for the changes was the fact of 
not entering the government [Bille 1997: 389].
Some researchers, who have advanced the concept which assumes that the length 
of time of the term of office is influenced by the perception of the leaders by bodies 
that have the right to remove them from the post, have reached beyond an analysis 
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of institutional and situational factors. This proposal is founded on the assumption 
that the bodies having the right to decide about the length of the term of office eval-
uate the current leader with reference to his/her direct predecessor. In this way, the 
terms of office of leaders who succeed ones who proved effective for many years 
are shorter than those of leaders who perform the function having succeeded less 
effective leaders [Horiuchi, Laing, ’t Hart 2015: 357–358].
Table 2 includes reasons relating to Polish party leader exits, which have been 
grouped in compliance with the division covering six categories [Cross, Blais 2011: 
135]. The analysis allows extending this typology by two more categories. Therefore, 
a change (cessation) of party leadership may be connected with the following: (1) 
voluntary resignation; (2) resignation under pressure; (3) resignation due to a dif-
ference of opinion regarding one specific issue; (4) political party ceased to exists; 
(5) death of the leader; (6) formal dismissal; (7) not running for re-election; (8) not 
being elected for the next term of office. Since it is a subjective assessment whether 
or not the stepping down was enforced, thus, including the cases into the first and 
the second, and also partially the seventh category, may pose some difficulty. The 
voluntary resignation is when the leader is not compelled to step down [Cross, Blais 
2011: 135].
Table 2. Reasons for leader exits of political parties in Poland
Leader Date of election Date of exit Reason for the exit
PiS 
Lech Kaczyński 29.05.2001 18.01.2003 voluntary resignation
PO 
Maciej Płażyński 18.10.2001 09.04.2003 resignation because of a single, specific disagreement with the party
Donald Tusk 09.04.2003 08.11.2014 voluntary resignation
PSL 
Roman Bartoszcze 05.05.1990 29.06.1991 not running for re-election
Waldemar Pawlak 29.06.1991 11.10.1997 formal removal
Jarosław Kalinowski 11.10.1997 16.03.2004 resignation under pressure
Janusz Wojciechowski 16.03.2004 29.01.2005 resignation because of a single, specific disagreement with the party
Waldemar Pawlak 29.01.2005 17.11.2012 not being elected for the next term of office
SLD 
Leszek Miller 15.04.1999 06.04.2004 resignation under pressure
Krzysztof Janik 06.04.2004 18.12.2004 not being elected for the next term of office
Józef Oleksy 18.12.2004 29.05.2005 resignation under pressure
Wojciech Olejniczak 29.05.2005 31.05.2008 not being elected for the next term of office
Grzegorz Napieralski 31.05.2008 10.12.2011 resignation under pressure
Source: Prepared on the basis of press information
In the case of the two parties descending from the Solidarity Movement, that is 
the PO and the PiS, each of them has changed its leader. In both cases it was a volun-
tary resignation connected with taking a post in local government (Lech Kaczyński) 
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or within the structures of the European Union (Donald Tusk). As regards the PSL, 
each of the five party leader changes has been classified within a different category. 
The PSL leader was dismissed once. Besides, in 1991 Roman Bartoszcze, who was 
the party leader then, was attempted to be removed from his post twice. The exerted 
pressure, which was meant to make the leader resign, was the major reason why the 
leader of the SLD stepped down. As regards the SLD, there have been five changes 
of the party leader. Three of the leaders were compelled to resign under the pressure 
of the party. The other two lost re-elections.
The analysis of the Polish case shows that party leaders, in a similar manner as 
leaders of political parties in consolidated West European democracies, rarely resign 
voluntarily. It is possible to indicate the above mentioned cases with no interpreta-
tional problems only in two situations. Generally speaking, the leaderships in the PiS 
and the PO are characterized by stability and a lack of competitiveness (the PiS) or 
limited competitiveness (the PO) in fight for power in the party. The situation looks 
different in the cases of the SLD and the PSL, within which there have occurred al-
ternations of the leader (cf. Tab. 1). In the case of the former, in the years 2004–2005 
the party went through a crisis of leadership as a result of frequent leader changes.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the limited number of studies, it is possible to present a few gener-
alizations concerning party leadership on their basis. The growing role of party 
leaders is accompanied by a change in their selection methods [Pilet, Cross 2014b: 
2]. Whereas in mass parties, it is a party congress that decides about the selection 
[Sobolewska-Myślik, Kosowska-Gąstoł, Borowiec 2010: 153], in the case of cartel 
type parties, the leader is selected directly by party members. As Katz and Mair 
underline, the formal growth in the role of party members is accompanied by the 
weakening of better organised and easier to mobilize activists of the middle level. 
According to the authors, this leads to strengthening of party leader position [Katz 
2001; Katz, Mair 1995; Mair 1994].
In 1965, the most common method of selecting leaders was that by the congress 
attended by delegates selected by regional branches of the party, often with the par-
ticipation of MPs, representatives of trade unions, youth and women’s organizations 
and sometimes ideological factions [Pilet, Cross 2014a: 226]. Nowadays, the situ-
ation has not changed considerably and the selection is still made by the congress. 
Still, the second most popular method is the direct election of the leader by party 
members [Pilet, Cross 2014a: 226]. Consequently, in political parties, representative 
democracy dominates over direct democracy.
On the basis of the analysis of about 70 political parties in 13 parliamentary 
democracies over nearly 50 years (or since the moment of their transition to democ-
racy in the case of the states of Southern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe), one 
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can speak of a visible, though not universal, trend towards increasing inclusiveness 
while choosing party leaders. Many examined parties decided to adopt more inclusive 
procedures to select their party leaders following (1) election defeats, and (2) during 
the time when they were in opposition [Pilet, Cross 2014a: 226].
There is no explicit answer in the literature to the question whether democra-
tization of elections is connected with the selection of party leaders of different 
demographic features (sex, age) or personal experience (length of parliamentary 
service, experience of working in the government or the lack of it) in comparison 
with leaders selected on the basis of more exclusive methods, such as an election 
by party bodies.
Leadership in Polish political parties has not been analysed adequately yet in 
the way that would deal with the issues raised in this paper. The Polish parties have 
not also been included in the growing number of international comparative studies. 
It seems that the Polish case could introduce certain corrections to and complement 
the explanations present in the literature, relating to the methods of party leader 
selection, and also verify the causes behind the rise in the election participation, 
which – according to the literature – is connected with the rise in the competitiveness 
of elections. 
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